

## Complex 2030

### **Background**

Complex 2030 is the plan for a massive overhaul of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. The goal is to continuously produce new nuclear weapons, with the so-called Reliable Replacement Warheads being the first off the line. The plan is being sold by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the semi-autonomous nuclear weapons agency within the Department of Energy, as a smaller, safer, and more efficient version of the current nuclear weapons complex.

But the facts tell a different story: The current nuclear stockpile is not in need of replacement, all of the existing nuclear weapons sites would still be in operation under the new plan, and the fundamental environmental problems of weapons production would not be solved. Furthermore, the increased design, production, and testing capabilities of Complex 2030 could spark a new nuclear arms race.

The Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that Complex 2030 will cost \$150 billion over the next 25 years. This figure does not include future decommissioning and environmental remediation, and it is almost certain to increase dramatically. The Government Accountability Office has singled out Complex 2030 for congressional oversight, citing “DOE’s history of poor project management.”

### Plutonium Manufacturing and Research Consolidated at a Single Facility

Complex 2030 includes a bomb plant with the capacity to produce a minimum of 125 plutonium bomb cores (or “pits”) annually. This needless return to Cold War-scale plutonium pit production would undermine the global nonproliferation regime and encourage existing nuclear weapons states to expand their own capabilities. The plutonium pits in the current nuclear arsenal have been found by an independent federally funded analysis to remain viable for a minimum of 85 to 100 years, and likely longer. Furthermore, pit production has a dreadful environmental record. The pit facility at Rocky Flats was shut down by the FBI for environmental crimes and remains a dangerously contaminated site.

### Consolidation of Large Quantities of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium

These sensitive materials would be moved from seven current sites into five. At sites where work with plutonium and highly enriched uranium continues (Los Alamos, Y-12, Savannah River, Pantex, Nevada Test Site), fewer locations within those sites would house such activities. This would allow for improved security around these dangerous weapons-usable materials and should also move them away from heavily populated areas.

### Acceleration of Dismantlement Activities

The goal of increasing the dismantlement of nuclear weapons is a step in the right direction, and increasing this activity is one of the very few positive attributes of this otherwise provocative and dangerous plan.

## Talking Points

- **The cost will be huge, clearly more than \$150 billion.**
- **The goals of Complex 2030 can be achieved without the huge construction program.**

A “curatorship” approach that maintains the current stockpile through surveillance, non-nuclear testing, and repair could accomplish the major stated goals of Complex 2030: ensured safety/reliability of the stockpile, no return to testing, increased dismantlement, removal of dangerous and vulnerable nuclear materials from many sites, and increased efficiency—while moving toward meeting our nation’s disarmament obligations under international law.

- **“Consolidation” doesn’t mean a smaller complex.**

Claims that Complex 2030 will result in a smaller nuclear weapons complex are misleading. NNSA’s plan would consolidate from eight major sites to...*eight major sites*. Not a single one would be closed. New construction or facility upgrades are planned for all eight sites and will cost, conservatively, \$150 billion.

## Legislative Recommendations for 2007

Initially, the administration will likely seek fairly modest funding to implement Complex 2030, probably in the low tens of millions for FY 2008. An FY 2008 request of \$25–\$75 million is likely for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. Funding for Complex 2030 will increase dramatically in the out-years, requiring either increases in the DOE budget or significant cuts in other DOE programs, such as Environmental Management. It is more likely that Congress will be asked in FY 2009 than FY 2008 to endorse moving to the engineering, development, and production phase of an RRW warhead.

Congress should not support the DOE’s Complex 2030 proposal. Before embarking on a program to rebuild the nuclear weapons complex, the United States should first reexamine the fundamental goals of its nuclear policy. Decades after the Cold War, the United States and Russia maintain thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert, ready for launch within minutes and threatening incalculable destruction. Congress should initiate a debate on the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy.

- Relevant congressional committees should hold hearings on U.S. nuclear weapons policy and posture, bringing in outside experts.
- Funding for the Complex 2030 proposal should be denied.
- Funding for the RRW program should be eliminated.
- Congress should examine the current nuclear weapons complex and seek to reduce costs, improve security, and reduce environmental impacts by consolidating nuclear materials, eliminating redundant or unneeded capacity, and cleaning up existing sites.
- Congress should mandate independent studies to examine the health of the stockpile and the life span of weapons, especially considering the implications of recent studies on plutonium aging.
- Congress should require the DOE to improve its stockpile surveillance program, which has fallen behind schedule, and conduct an updated Stockpile Surveillance Report, which was last completed in 1995.

## **Additional Resources**

Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

<http://www.ananuclear.org/>

Nuclear Watch of New Mexico

<http://www.nukewatch.org/index.php>

Tri-Valley CARES

<http://www.trivalleycares.org/>

Union of Concerned Scientists: Global Security—Nuclear Weapons

[http://www.ucsusa.org/global\\_security/nuclear\\_weapons/](http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_weapons/)

Complex 2030 Infrastructure Planning Scenario

[http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/Complex\\_2030\\_Infrastructure\\_Planning\\_Scenario.pdf](http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/Complex_2030_Infrastructure_Planning_Scenario.pdf)

Complex 2030 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

<http://www.complex2030peis.com/>