North Korea

While reports claim that North Korea has acquired enough material for several nuclear weapons, negotiations to halt its nuclear weapons program have stalled. In meantime, North Korea continues to produce bomb-grade material and threatened to begin exporting nuclear materials unless the United States agrees to one-on-one talks with North Korea. Most recently, reports have raised concerns that North Korea may be preparing a nuclear weapon test.

History

After 35 years of Japanese rule preceding World War II, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel as a compromise between the West and the USSR, creating North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea –DPRK) and South Korea. Kim Il Sung who had already begun his cult of personality, invaded South Korea, provoking the Korean War which ended in a cease-fire in 1953 after three years of war, killing 35,000 US soldiers, 400,000 South Koreans and over a million North Korean and Chinese, but without a peace treaty. The war caused tensions between North Korea and the USSR, and in the 1960s, North Korea’s relations with China became more difficult. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 added to North Korea’s increasing isolation. These events led at least in part to North Korea developing of nuclear weapons in an attempt to project self-reliance and as a way to gain international leverage for the survival of its regime, under direction from Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung’s son and successor.

Clinton Administration: The 1994 Agreed Framework and the 1998 missile tests

In 1994, North Korea and the United States came close to war with North Korea. The crisis resulted from the decision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), following the discovery of Iraq’s nuclear program after the first Gulf War ended, to impose tougher inspections on North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea defied the international community and threatened to pull out of the Nuclear Nonprolifeation Treaty (NPT). As the United States planned for possible strikes on North Korean nuclear complex, North Korea prepared to retaliate, warning that Seoul would become a “sea of fire.” Resolving the crisis through deft diplomacy and the intervention of former President Carter, the United States and North Korea signed an agreement in 1994 to stop North Korean’s nuclear weapons program. This accord provided:

• Froze in North Korea’s plutonium production program.
• North Korea agreed to remain in the NPT and accept enhanced international safeguards
• In exchange, the agreement called for the replacement of the DPRK’s graphite reactors with two light water reactors (to decrease the risk of proliferation), supplying North Korea with heavy fuel oil until the nuclear power plants were built
• Both sides promised to take steps toward the normalization of economic and political relations. A nuclear-free zone was envisioned, and both sides committed to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime was made.

Although the Agreed Framework delayed North Korea’s nuclear program, North Korea and the United States (split between a Democratic Administration and a Republican Congress as of 1994), disagreed over the implementation of the Agreement. In 1998, North Korea conducted provocative missile tests that threatened regional stability. Prior to the end of the Clinton Administration, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveled to North Korea in 2000 to start direct talks with Kim Il Sung, laying the foundation for stopping North Korea’s missile exports and freezing the production of missile technology.

Bush Administration: DPRK withdraws from the NPT and accelerates its nuclear weapons program.

After his election, President George W. Bush chose not to pursue direct negotiations with North Korea. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Il became more defiant.

In October 2002, the United States announced that it had uncovered a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in North Korea, which was partly supplied by Pakistan’s AQ Khan network. The United States in response to this violation of previous agreements halts the supply of heavy oil to North Korea. The North responded by suspending the freeze of its plutonium production and expelling International Atomic Energy (IAEA) inspectors in December 2002. By January 2003, North Korea had withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korea is believed to have produced enough material for at least six nuclear weapons.

The 6-Party Talks vs. Direct Talks

While the United States is committed to negotiations only through the 6-Party Talks framework to discuss North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, North Korea insists on its preference for direct talks with the Untied States.

The Six-Party Talks, which began with the United States, China, and North Korea in April 2003, also include Japan, South Korea and Russia. Critics consider the 6-Party talks a failed strategy, as these negotiations have stalled repeatedly and failed to end or delay North Korea’s nuclear weapon program. Some of the main points of friction arise over disagreements on sequencing and implementation, as well as the nature of the talks themselves.

In September 2005, the six parties signed a Statement of Principles, marking a short-lived improvement in the negotiations. This agreement was reached six months after North Korea announced that it possessed nuclear weapons and provided that North Korea would terminate its nuclear programs, return to the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards. The United States stated its peaceful intentions toward North Korea and vowed not to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea. However only one day after the announcement of the deal, both sides disagreed about implementation of the agreement and sequencing (reticent to make any concrete concessions before ensuring implementation of reciprocal promise, North Korea demanded that the United States first provide the North with a light water reactor before any action be taken on the DPRK side), lead to a collapse of the agreement of principles.

North Korea has refused to rejoin the 6-party talks, although the five parties met in August 2006 without North Korea, to little avail.

In June 2006, North Korea requested direct talks with the United States, which the United States refused reiterating its insistence on negotiations in the context of the Six-Party Talks.

Capabilities: Development of a nuclear weapons capability

It is unknown exactly how many nuclear weapons North Korea has, or even if North Korea definitely has the capability or has weaponized devices. North Korean has not conducted a nuclear weapon test and there are no IAEA inspectors present to verify a military program. North Korea claims that it has a nuclear weapons capability, a claim that is consistent with suspicions that North Korea has separated plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.

In 2002 when IAEA inspectors were expelled from North Korean facilities, they had reported discrepancies between what the North had declared and what the inspectors found, and that North Korea could have reprocessed enough plutonium for one to two bombs, an estimate echoed then by the US Central Intelligence Agency. In May 2005, US intelligence retrieved satellite photos which indicated that the North had shut down one of its reactors and removed the spent fuel. It is estimated that there would be enough spent fuel there for one to three bombs.

The United States also believes that North Korea is or has attempting to build a uranium enrichment facility.

Many of North Korean nuclear weapons facilities are suspected of being hidden underground.

Recent developments

Missile Tests: North Korea tested short and medium-range missiles on July 5, 2006, as well as a long-range Taepodong-2 missile (believed to be a follow-on technology to the Taepodong-1 ballistic missile tested in 1998). The Taepodong-2 test failed and crashed into the Sea of Japan. It is believed that, if successful, the Taepodong-2 has intercontinental range and could hit the United States’ Western seaboard.

Possible preparations for a nuclear weapon test: More alarming in terms of its nuclear weapons capability, in August and September 2006, the detection of activity around a suspected nuclear weapon site raised fears that the North was preparing for a nuclear test. As yet, no test has occurred.

Need for a viable diplomatic strategy to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability

Frustrated by North Korea’s refusal to rejoin the Six Party Talks and the recent missile tests, the United States is considering imposing additional sanctions on North Korea, but has not outlined a viable strategy to deal with North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons program.

Without neither sufficient intelligence about this secretive regime and the location of nuclear weapons sites nor the capability to penetrate deep enough underground, a military strike would prove costly as North Korea would likely retaliate and strike South Korea, and ineffective as it would likely fail to destroy North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability.

With no diplomatic solution likely, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear weapons program, posing a significant threat to US and international security.